Cloning Relationships: Intellectual Property Rights And The Ownership Of Genetic Identity
- YourLawArticle

- Nov 6
- 2 min read
Updated: Nov 7
Written by: Srihari.S , LL.M(IP), 1st Year, Amity School Of Law , Noida
Abstract
Cloning technologies, once confined to the realm of scientific speculation, have now entered contemporary legal, ethical, and policy debates. Much of the existing scholarship addresses cloning from biomedical, bioethical, and regulatory perspectives, yet a critical dimension remains largely unexplored: the intersection of intellectual property rights (IPR) and human relationships. This research examines how ownership claims over genetic identity—arising through patents, copyrights, or related IPR regimes—may influence familial, social, and relational dynamics. It investigates whether a cloned individual’s genetic makeup can be commodified as intellectual property, and how such commodification may affect parent–child bonds, sibling relations, and even spousal or partner relationships when cloning is employed to recreate deceased loved ones. By bridging insights from biotechnology law, human rights discourse, and relational sociology, this study contributes to a novel understanding of cloning as not only a technological and legal issue but also a relational challenge.
Modern patent jurisprudence, particularly after landmark cases such as Diamond v. Chakrabarty[1] (1980), has paved the way for treating biotechnological inventions, including genetic modifications, as property. However, the implications of such recognition become problematic in the context of cloning, where the subject of ownership is not merely genetic material but the identity of a potential human being. If genetic identity can be claimed as intellectual property, complex relational consequences emerge: a cloned child may be viewed as both a legal subject and a product sibling may grapple with questions of equality and authenticity, and partners may use cloning as a substitute for lost relationships. These issues stretch beyond bioethics, implicating the very foundations of kinship, inheritance, and personal identity.
This research therefore seeks to bridge a critical gap in the literature by analyzing cloning as not only a biotechnological and legal issue but also as a relational challenge. It investigates how existing IPR regimes—designed to encourage innovation—might inadvertently commodify human identity, and whether such commodification undermines human dignity. By adopting a doctrinal and interdisciplinary methodology, the study draws upon international instruments such as the TRIPS Agreement, UNESCO’s[2] Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, and comparative national laws to evaluate the adequacy of current frameworks. The ultimate objective is to propose a rights-based legal model that balances technological progress with the protection.
Keywords: cloning, intellectual property rights, genetic identity, bioethics, biotechnology law, human dignity, TRIPS Agreement, patent law, human rights, genetic modification, relational sociology, family law, kinship, inheritance, commodification of human life
[1] Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
[2] Leon R Kass, ‘The Wisdom of Repugnance: Why We Should Ban the Cloning of Humans’ (1997) The New Republic https://newrepublic.com accessed 6 November 2025.



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