Telecommunications Regulation and Media Law in India: Constitutional Implications and Comparative Perspectives

Written by: Purav Arora , B.A.LL.B (Hons.) | Lloyd School of Law, Greater Noida, Uttar Pradesh

JUSTICE

1. INTRODUCTION

India's telecommunications sector has traversed a remarkable institutional journey over the past three decades — from a vertically integrated state monopoly to a liberalised, spectrum-driven, and increasingly cloud-dependent ecosystem. The National Telecom Policy of 1999 marked a decisive shift toward competitive markets and private participation,^[1] while the enactment of the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India Act, 1997 established an independent regulatory body mandated to promote and ensure orderly growth of the telecom sector.^[2] The subsequent creation of the Telecom Disputes Settlement and Appellate Tribunal (TDSAT) institutionalised sector-specific adjudication and provided a structured forum for the resolution of disputes between operators, licensors, and consumers.

What was not, perhaps, fully anticipated at the time of these institutional reforms was the degree to which telecommunications infrastructure would come to constitute the foundational layer upon which the entire edifice of contemporary media expression rests. Broadcasting services, OTT video platforms, digital news organisations, podcast networks, and social media platforms all depend on telecom networks for carriage, bandwidth, and reach. This infrastructural dependency has transformed what were once purely technical regulatory decisions — spectrum allocation, licensing conditions, quality-of-service standards, and network management rules — into decisions with direct and substantial consequences for the exercise of the freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution.^[3]

The constitutional dimension of telecom regulation has been brought into sharp relief by developments such as internet shutdowns directed under executive orders, government-mandated content blocking under Section 69A of the Information Technology Act, 2000,^[4] and the contested due diligence obligations imposed upon digital intermediaries by the IT (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021.^[5] The Supreme Court's ruling in Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India^[6] confirmed that internet access is integral to the exercise of fundamental rights, thereby formally linking telecom governance to constitutional law. The Telecommunications Act, 2023^[7] has modernised the legislative framework but has not resolved the deeper constitutional tensions that pervade the regulatory ecosystem.

Against this backdrop, this paper pursues three interrelated objectives. First, it maps the existing regulatory architecture governing the telecom-media interface in India, identifying points of structural fragmentation and jurisdictional overlap. Second, it analyses the constitutional implications of key regulatory instruments and judicial decisions, with particular attention to the proportionality standard that now governs restrictions on fundamental rights. Third, it examines comparative regulatory models in the United States, the United Kingdom, and the European Union, and considers the lessons that India may prudently draw from those experiences. The analysis culminates in a set of reform recommendations oriented toward a more constitutionally coherent and institutionally unified framework for converged communications governance.

2. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This research is grounded in a doctrinal legal methodology, which proceeds through the systematic analysis of primary legal materials — legislative texts, constitutional provisions, and judicial decisions — supplemented by secondary scholarship in comparative constitutional law and communications regulation. The doctrinal method is appropriate for this inquiry because the central questions are normative ones concerning the meaning, coherence, and constitutional validity of statutory provisions and regulatory practices.

Primary sources consulted include: the Constitution of India; the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India Act, 1997^[8]; the Telecommunications Act, 2023^[9]; the Information Technology Act, 2000^[10]; the IT Rules, 2021^[11]; judgments of the Supreme Court of India and various High Courts; and foreign legislative instruments including the Communications Act, 2003 (UK),^[12] the Online Safety Act, 2023 (UK),^[13] and the EU Digital Markets Act.^[14]

Comparative analysis is employed not as an exercise in legislative transplantation but as a tool for identifying structural principles and institutional lessons that are adaptable to the Indian constitutional context. The comparative jurisdictions — the United States, the United Kingdom, and the European Union — have been selected because each represents a distinct regulatory philosophy: speech-maximalist, rights-sensitive interventionist, and harmonised competition-centric, respectively. The contrast between these models and India's fragmented sector-specific approach illuminates the path toward meaningful reform.

3. THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK: ARTICLE 19(1)(A) AND ITS LIMITS

3.1 Freedom of Speech and Expression as a Foundational Right

Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India guarantees to all citizens the right to freedom of speech and expression. The Supreme Court has construed this guarantee expansively to encompass not merely oral or written communication but the right to disseminate information through electronic media, digital platforms, and the internet. The constitutional protection, however, is not absolute: Article 19(2) permits Parliament to impose 'reasonable restrictions' on this right in the interests of, among other things, the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, public order, decency, and morality.^[15]

The constitutional framework for media and telecom regulation is thus defined by a structural tension between expressive liberty and the State's legitimate interest in regulating the communications infrastructure as a public resource. In Secretary, Ministry of Information & Broadcasting v. Cricket Association of Bengal,^[16] the Supreme Court held that airwaves constitute public property and that the State is entitled to regulate their use in the public interest. This 'public resource doctrine' has since been invoked to justify spectrum management and broadcasting licensing as legitimate exercises of state power.

3.2 The Proportionality Standard

A significant development in India's constitutional jurisprudence has been the formal adoption of the proportionality standard as the governing test for the validity of restrictions on fundamental rights. In the landmark decision in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India,^[17] a nine-judge Constitution Bench unanimously held that any state action limiting a fundamental right must satisfy four conditions: it must be anchored in legality; it must pursue a legitimate state aim; it must be necessary (i.e., the least restrictive means of achieving the aim); and the harm caused to the right-holder must be proportionate to the benefit sought. This four-pronged test has become the constitutional template against which all regulatory measures affecting digital expression must be assessed.

The proportionality requirement was applied with particular rigour in the context of internet shutdowns in Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India.^[18] The Court held that a blanket suspension of internet services fails the proportionality test because it restricts far more speech than is necessary to address the specific threat to public order. Orders must be time-limited, subject to periodic review, and publicly accessible so that affected persons may challenge them. This ruling has reshaped the legal landscape governing emergency telecom restrictions, though concerns about implementation and executive compliance persist.

3.3 The Constitutional Validity of Content Regulation: Lessons from Shreya Singhal

The constitutional limits on legislative regulation of digital speech were authoritatively defined in Shreya Singhal v. Union of India.^[19] In this decision, the Supreme Court struck down Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 — which criminalised the sending of 'grossly offensive' or 'menacing' electronic communications — on the ground that the provision was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. The Court held that a restriction on speech must define with precision the conduct it prohibits; vague formulations confer on law enforcement and executive authorities an unacceptably wide discretion that chills protected expression.

The Court in Shreya Singhal also addressed the intermediary liability framework under Section 79 of the IT Act, holding that a platform could lose its safe-harbour protection only upon receipt of a court order or a government directive, and not merely upon notice from a private complainant. This ruling has shaped the architecture of the IT Rules, 2021, though critics argue that those Rules reintroduce compliance obligations that effectively require platforms to act as pre-emptive censors, a concern subsequently validated by the Bombay High Court in Kunal Kamra v. Union of India,^[20] where amendments establishing a government-controlled fact-checking unit were invalidated as unconstitutional.

4. THE REGULATORY ARCHITECTURE: STRUCTURE, FRAGMENTATION, AND GAPS

4.1 The Multi-Regulator Framework

India's regulation of the telecom-media interface is distributed across several statutory bodies, each operating under a distinct legislative mandate. The Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI), constituted under the TRAI Act, 1997,^[21] exercises regulatory functions in respect of spectrum, licensing, tariff determination, and quality of service. The Telecom Disputes Settlement and Appellate Tribunal (TDSAT) adjudicates disputes between licensors, licensees, and consumers.^[22] The Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MeitY) administers the Information Technology Act, 2000 and the IT Rules, 2021. The Ministry of Information and Broadcasting (MIB) oversees broadcasting and print media. Competition matters fall within the jurisdiction of the Competition Commission of India (CCI).

This institutional architecture, which evolved incrementally rather than by design, generates significant structural tensions. Questions involving OTT platforms — which transmit content through telecom networks, distribute it through digital intermediaries, and exercise editorial discretion akin to broadcasters — fall simultaneously within the potential jurisdictions of TRAI, MeitY, and MIB. The resulting regulatory uncertainty is not merely an administrative inconvenience; it creates compliance burdens for operators, generates arbitrage opportunities, and produces the kind of institutional incoherence that courts have found difficult to supervise and correct.

4.2 The Telecommunications Act, 2023: Modernisation and its Limits

The Telecommunications Act, 2023^[23] represents the most comprehensive legislative reform of India's telecom governance framework since the enactment of the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885. The Act introduces a consolidated authorisation framework replacing the earlier licence-based system, modernises spectrum assignment provisions, and enhances state powers over network security and lawful interception.^[24] These are significant improvements that bring Indian telecom law into closer alignment with contemporary best practices in network governance.

Nevertheless, the Act is not without limitations. Its network security and interception provisions vest considerable discretionary power in the Central Government, with limited procedural safeguards and no provision for independent parliamentary or judicial oversight of interception authorisations. Given the constitutional significance of telecommunications infrastructure as the medium through which contemporary speech is exercised, this concentration of executive power raises proportionality concerns that the Act does not adequately address. Furthermore, the Act does not engage with platform governance, content regulation, or the relationship between telecom regulation and media law — leaving the multi-regulator fragmentation problem unresolved.

4.3 Dispute Resolution: The Inadequacy of TDSAT in a Converged Environment

TDSAT was designed to resolve disputes in the conventional telecom sector — primarily between telecom service providers and their licensors.^[25] The digital convergence of the past decade has rendered this institutional design inadequate. Disputes now routinely arise among entities that do not fit neatly within the traditional licensee-licensor framework: OTT platforms, content aggregators, digital news outlets, and algorithmic intermediaries are engaged in commercial and regulatory contestations that implicate both economic regulation and constitutional rights.

Carriage fee disputes between OTT platforms and telecom operators, platform access disputes, and disputes over differential treatment of traffic raise questions under the TRAI Broadcasting and Cable Services Regulations,^[26] competition law, and constitutional non-discrimination principles simultaneously. TDSAT's jurisdictional framework, defined by reference to the licensing structure of the 1997 Act, does not accommodate these multi-dimensional disputes. The absence of a unified adjudicatory forum with cross-sectoral jurisdiction produces delays, inconsistent outcomes, and a risk of 'forum shopping' by well-resourced parties.

5. COMPARATIVE REGULATORY MODELS: UNITED STATES, UNITED KINGDOM, AND EUROPEAN UNION

5.1 The United States: First Amendment Supremacy and Structural Pluralism

The United States regulatory model is grounded in a strong free-speech culture derived from the First Amendment, which prohibits Congress from making any law 'abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.' The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) regulates broadcast media, telecommunications, and certain aspects of internet services under the Communications Act, 1934, as amended. FCC decisions are subject to judicial review before the federal courts of appeals, and the courts have consistently applied constitutional scrutiny to regulatory measures affecting speech.

The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC^[27] illustrates the American approach: the Court upheld the FCC's relaxation of media ownership rules, finding that the agency had reasonably weighed the relevant statutory factors under the Administrative Procedure Act's 'arbitrary and capricious' standard. The case confirms that American courts apply procedural and substantive rationality review to media regulatory decisions rather than strict constitutional scrutiny in most cases, reserving the latter for direct content-based restrictions.

Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act^[28] provides broad immunity to online platforms for third-party content, reflecting the legislative judgment that the internet's expressive potential is best protected by limiting platform liability. This approach has been both celebrated as a driver of digital innovation and criticised as enabling the spread of harmful content. The United States has not adopted centralised content regulation comparable to India's IT Rules, relying instead on market competition, civil litigation, and constitutional challenges as the primary mechanisms of accountability.

5.2 The United Kingdom: Unified Regulation and Rights-Sensitive Intervention

The United Kingdom has adopted a unified regulatory approach through Ofcom, which exercises jurisdiction over telecommunications, broadcasting, and, progressively, online services under the Communications Act, 2003.^[29] Ofcom's regulatory functions are exercised within a framework shaped by the Human Rights Act, 1998,^[30] which requires all public authorities, including regulatory bodies, to act compatibly with Convention rights, including the right to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. This constitutional constraint requires Ofcom to demonstrate the proportionality of all regulatory interventions.

The Online Safety Act, 2023^[31] represents the most comprehensive legislative response to the governance of digital platforms in any jurisdiction. It imposes 'duty of care' obligations on regulated services, requires platforms to conduct risk assessments, mandates transparent content moderation standards, and provides structured mechanisms for Ofcom oversight. Crucially, the Act is Parliament-enacted primary legislation rather than executive delegated regulation — a distinction that is constitutionally significant because it subjects the regulatory framework to a higher degree of legislative scrutiny and judicial accountability than rule-based administrative regimes.

5.3 The European Union: Horizontal Harmonisation and Competition-Centric Governance

The European Union has pursued a horizontal regulatory strategy through the Digital Markets Act (DMA)^[32] and the Digital Services Act (DSA),^[33] which together establish a harmonised framework for digital platform governance across all Member States. The DMA addresses structural competition issues by imposing ex ante obligations on 'gatekeeper' platforms, while the DSA establishes tiered obligations for online intermediaries based on their size and the nature of the risks they pose to users and society.

The EU model's strength lies in its legislative architecture: it is enacted through primary EU law, applies uniformly across jurisdictions, and is enforced by the European Commission with significant investigative and sanction powers. The horizontal approach avoids the fragmentation that characterises India's sector-specific regulatory structure and provides a level of regulatory predictability that benefits both operators and users. The EU model is less immediately transposable to India's constitutional framework because of differences in federal structure, constitutional culture, and the level of judicial infrastructure available for enforcement, but its structural logic — unified framework, tiered obligations, proportionate enforcement — offers a compelling template for reform.

5.4 Comparative Assessment: What India May Learn

A comparative assessment reveals that each of the three jurisdictions addressed above has resolved the telecom-media regulatory interface in a manner broadly consistent with its constitutional culture. The United States relies on robust First Amendment litigation and market competition to check regulatory overreach. The United Kingdom combines unified regulatory oversight with statutory human rights constraints. The European Union employs harmonised horizontal legislation and competition enforcement. India's current model — characterised by multi-regulator fragmentation, executive-led content regulation, and limited independent oversight — compares unfavourably with all three on dimensions of constitutional accountability and regulatory coherence.

India cannot and should not transplant any of these models wholesale, for reasons of constitutional design, institutional capacity, and social context. However, selective adaptation is both feasible and desirable. From the UK model, India may draw the principle of a unified digital communications regulator with cross-sectoral jurisdiction and statutory human rights obligations. From the EU model, India may adopt the concept of tiered, proportionate obligations for digital intermediaries based on size and risk. From the US model, India may strengthen the judicial scrutiny applicable to government-initiated blocking and shutdown orders, insisting on narrow tailoring and independent review.

6. CRITICAL ANALYSIS: CONSTITUTIONAL TENSIONS IN INDIA'S REGULATORY PRACTICE

6.1 Internet Shutdowns and the Proportionality Deficit

India has the unenviable distinction of conducting the highest number of internet shutdowns globally in recent years. While the Telecom Suspension Rules, 2017, and now the Telecommunications Act, 2023,^[34] provide a legal basis for such suspensions, the procedural safeguards remain inadequate. Executive shutdown orders are frequently vague as to scope and duration, are rarely subjected to prospective judicial scrutiny, and routinely affect commercial, educational, and journalistic activities far beyond the stated security objective. The proportionality analysis mandated by Anuradha Bhasin^[35] requires that the least restrictive means be employed; a blanket district-wide shutdown, by definition, cannot satisfy this requirement.

6.2 The IT Rules, 2021: Delegated Regulation and Constitutional Risk

The IT Rules, 2021^[36] have been criticised on constitutional grounds for several reasons. The mandatory appointment of a Grievance Appellate Committee — a government-controlled body — to hear appeals against platform content moderation decisions creates a structural risk of executive influence over speech decisions that are constitutionally required to be governed by judicial or quasi-judicial oversight. The short compliance timelines imposed on intermediaries create operational pressure to over-remove content to avoid losing safe-harbour protection. The requirement for OTT platforms to observe a 'code of ethics' enforced through the MIB introduces content oversight into a domain that, by constitutional logic, should be subject to the same speech protections as press freedom. The Bombay High Court's decision in Kunal Kamra^[37] striking down the government fact-checking unit is a significant judicial corrective, but the broader constitutional concerns raised by the Rules remain unresolved.

6.3 The International Human Rights Dimension

India is a State Party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Article 19 of which guarantees freedom of expression subject to restrictions that are 'provided by law' and 'necessary' for specified legitimate purposes.^[38] The ICCPR standard closely resembles the proportionality test adopted by the Supreme Court in Puttaswamy.^[39] The concern raised by civil society and international observers is not that India lacks the legal standards — it does not — but that the executive's practice of broad, opacity-shrouded restrictions on digital communications falls short of those standards in implementation. The opacity of Section 69A blocking orders and the absence of an independent telecommunications ombudsman are particularly noted in this regard. The issue is ultimately one of governance and accountability rather than of the constitutional text.

7. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A COHERENT AND RIGHTS-SENSITIVE FRAMEWORK

The analysis in the preceding sections supports the following recommendations for structural reform of India's telecom-media regulatory architecture.

7.1 Establishment of a Unified Digital Communications Regulator

India should, over the medium term, consolidate the regulatory functions currently distributed among TRAI, MIB (in respect of digital broadcasting), and MeitY (in respect of online platforms) into a single Digital Communications Authority with cross-sectoral jurisdiction. This body should be established by primary parliamentary legislation, should include members with expertise in law, technology, economics, and civil society, and should be operationally independent of the executive. Its mandate should explicitly incorporate constitutional proportionality requirements and should provide for structured consultation with affected stakeholders.

7.2 Statutory Reform of the Blocking and Shutdown Powers

The powers to block online content under Section 69A of the IT Act and to suspend telecom services under the Telecommunications Act, 2023 should be subject to mandatory judicial pre-authorisation in non-emergency cases, and to retrospective judicial review within 48 hours in emergency cases. All orders should be published in a public register accessible to affected parties, enabling timely constitutional challenge. Criteria for shutdown orders should be narrowly defined by statute to exclude blanket territorial suspensions except in the most extreme circumstances.

7.3 Replacement of Rule-Based Intermediary Regulation with Primary Legislation

The IT Rules, 2021, which are delegated legislation made by the executive under a broad statutory grant, should be replaced or substantially supplemented by primary parliamentary legislation governing digital platform obligations. Primary legislation would provide greater constitutional legitimacy, clearer parliamentary scrutiny, and a more durable basis for judicial review. The legislation should adopt a tiered approach to obligations, calibrated to the size, reach, and risk profile of regulated services, drawing on the structural logic of the EU Digital Services Act.

7.4 Reform of TDSAT's Jurisdiction for Converged Disputes

TDSAT's jurisdiction should be extended by legislative amendment to encompass disputes involving OTT platforms, content aggregators, and digital intermediaries insofar as those disputes concern carriage, platform access, or the terms of distribution through telecom networks. The Tribunal's procedural rules should be reformed to enable timely disposal of technically complex disputes, and its bench should include members with relevant technological and media expertise.

8. CONCLUSION

The convergence of telecommunications infrastructure and media expression has created a constitutional and regulatory landscape of considerable complexity in India. Decisions that once belonged exclusively to the domain of industrial policy — spectrum licensing, network management, intermediary compliance — now carry direct and substantial implications for the exercise of fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. The Supreme Court's development of the proportionality standard, as articulated in Puttaswamy and applied in Anuradha Bhasin and Shreya Singhal, has established the constitutional framework within which all such regulatory measures must operate. However, legislative and institutional reform has not kept pace with either technological change or judicial development.

The comparative analysis of regulatory models in the United States, the United Kingdom, and the European Union confirms that coherent, rights-sensitive governance of the digital communications ecosystem is achievable, and that the structural fragmentation and executive concentration of power that characterise India's current framework are not inevitable features of any regulatory system. The Telecommunications Act, 2023 is a step in the right direction for infrastructure governance but does not address the deeper constitutional tensions in the digital communications ecosystem.

What India requires is not merely technical legislative amendment but a fundamental reorientation of its regulatory philosophy — one that treats telecommunications infrastructure not merely as an economic resource to be managed by the State but as the indispensable medium through which citizens exercise their most fundamental expressive freedoms. A regulatory framework that is institutionally unified, constitutionally anchored, and procedurally transparent is both achievable and necessary. The constitutional promise of Article 19(1)(a) demands nothing less.

^[1]National Telecom Policy, 1999, Government of India, Department of Telecommunications.

^[2]Telecom Regulatory Authority of India Act, 1997 (Act No. 24 of 1997), Preamble.

^[3]Constitution of India, Art. 19(1)(a): 'All citizens shall have the right to freedom of speech and expression.'

^[4]Information Technology Act, 2000 (Act No. 21 of 2000), ss. 69A (blocking of information), 79 (intermediary safe harbour).

^[5]Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021, Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology, Gazette Notification S.O. 942(E), 25 February 2021.

^[6]Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India, (2020) 3 SCC 637 (Supreme Court of India). The Court held that internet access is integral to the exercise of the fundamental right under Art. 19(1)(a) and that restrictions thereon must satisfy the proportionality standard.

^[7]Telecommunications Act, 2023 (Act No. 44 of 2023), Statement of Objects and Reasons.

^[12]Communications Act, 2003 (UK), c. 21, ss. 3–4 (duties of OFCOM).

^[13]Online Safety Act, 2023 (UK), c. 50, ss. 7–56 (duty-of-care framework for regulated services).

^[14]Regulation (EU) 2022/1925 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2022 on Contestable and Fair Markets in the Digital Sector (Digital Markets Act), OJ L 265, 12.10.2022, p. 1.

^[15]Constitution of India, Art. 19(2) (reasonable restrictions on freedom of speech and expression).

^[16]Secretary, Ministry of Information & Broadcasting v. Cricket Association of Bengal, (1995) 2 SCC 161 (Supreme Court of India). The Court held that airwaves constitute public property and their use must be regulated in the public interest.

^[17]Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1 (Supreme Court of India, 9-Judge Bench). The Court unanimously held the right to privacy to be a fundamental right under Arts. 14, 19 and 21 and introduced the four-pronged proportionality test.

^[19]Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1 (Supreme Court of India). The Court struck down s. 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000, for constitutional vagueness and overbreadth.

^[20]Kunal Kamra v. Union of India, WP (L) No. 9792 of 2023 (Bombay High Court, decided 20 September 2024). The Court struck down Rule 3(1)(b)(v) of the IT (Amendment) Rules, 2023, as unconstitutional on grounds of Art. 14, 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(g).

^[21]TRAI Act, 1997, ss. 11–14 (functions and powers of the Authority).

^[22]Telecom Disputes Settlement and Appellate Tribunal Act, 2000 (Act No. 44 of 2000), s. 14 (jurisdiction of TDSAT).

^[23]Telecommunications Act, 2023, ss. 3–6 (spectrum assignment and authorisation framework).

^[24]Telecommunications Act, 2023 (Act No. 44 of 2023), ss. 20–24 (network security and lawful interception provisions).

^[26]TRAI (Broadcasting and Cable Services) (Standards of Quality of Service and Consumer Protection) Regulations, 2017, TRAI Regulation No. 1 of 2017.

^[27]Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 592 U.S. 414, 141 S. Ct. 1150 (2021). The U.S. Supreme Court held that the FCC's relaxation of media ownership rules was not arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act.

^[28]Section 230, Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (1996) (immunity of interactive computer service providers for third-party content).

^[30]Human Rights Act, 1998 (UK), c. 42, s. 3 (interpretation of legislation compatibly with Convention rights); Art. 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (freedom of expression).

^[33]Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services (Digital Services Act), OJ L 277, 27.10.2022, p. 1.

^[38]International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976), Art. 19. India ratified the ICCPR on 10 April 1979.

REFERENCES

I. Primary Legislation — India

Constitution of India (adopted 26 November 1949, entered into force 26 January 1950), Arts. 19(1)(a), 19(2), 21.

Telecom Regulatory Authority of India Act, 1997 (Act No. 24 of 1997).

Telecommunications Act, 2023 (Act No. 44 of 2023).

Information Technology Act, 2000 (Act No. 21 of 2000).

IT (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021, Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology, Gazette Notification S.O. 942(E), 25 February 2021.

TRAI (Broadcasting and Cable Services) (Standards of Quality of Service and Consumer Protection) Regulations, 2017, TRAI Regulation No. 1 of 2017.

Telecom Disputes Settlement and Appellate Tribunal Act, 2000 (Act No. 44 of 2000).

II. Judicial Decisions — India

Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India, (2020) 3 SCC 637 (Supreme Court of India).

Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1 (Supreme Court of India, 9-Judge Bench).

Kunal Kamra v. Union of India, WP (L) No. 9792 of 2023 (Bombay High Court, decided 20 September 2024).

Secretary, Ministry of Information & Broadcasting v. Cricket Association of Bengal, (1995) 2 SCC 161 (Supreme Court of India).

Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1 (Supreme Court of India).

III. Judicial Decisions — Foreign Jurisdictions

Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 592 U.S. 414, 141 S. Ct. 1150 (2021) (United States Supreme Court).

IV. Primary Legislation — Foreign Jurisdictions

Communications Act, 1934 (United States), 47 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq.

Communications Decency Act, 1996 (United States), 47 U.S.C. § 230 (intermediary immunity provision).

Communications Act, 2003 (United Kingdom), c. 21.

Human Rights Act, 1998 (United Kingdom), c. 42.

Online Safety Act, 2023 (United Kingdom), c. 50.

Regulation (EU) 2022/1925 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2022 on Contestable and Fair Markets in the Digital Sector (Digital Markets Act), OJ L 265, 12.10.2022, p. 1.

Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services (Digital Services Act), OJ L 277, 27.10.2022, p. 1.

V. International Instruments

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976). India acceded 10 April 1979.

European Convention on Human Rights (as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14), CETS No. 005 (1950), Art. 10 (freedom of expression).

VI. Secondary Sources

Baxi, Upendra, The Future of Human Rights (3rd ed., Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012).

Jain, M.P., Indian Constitutional Law (8th ed., LexisNexis, Gurugram, 2018).

Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology, 'Report of the Committee of Experts on Non-Personal Data Governance Framework' (2nd ed., December 2020).

National Telecom Policy, 1999, Government of India, Department of Telecommunications.

Seervai, H.M., Constitutional Law of India (4th ed., Universal Law Publishing, New Delhi, 2010).